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Abstract The maritime industry is a crucial link to transport billions in goods each year to
and from countries throughout the world. This historical mode of transportation has steadily
grown in importance, sustaining worldwide economic growth and the United States
economy. It is generally agreed that an attack against an American port would have a
long-lasting economic impact for the United States and its trading partners. Today’s
shipping container is the primary asset used to move cargo aboard commercial shipping
vessels. The containers are ubiquitous in our society with currently more than 34 million
20-ft equivalent units (TEU) in use around the globe today (World Shipping Council 2014).
The typical container used in shipping is a 20- or 40-ft enclosed container. These intermodal
containers have greatly enhanced the transportation industry but have also created immense
security susceptibilities. Millions of these containers enter the U.S. every year and only
small percentages can be inspected. These containers have posed a significant opportunity
for terrorist activities to employ weapons of mass destruction or biohazards within the
continental United States. This paper provides an overview of the current state and identifies
what public and private security initiative enhancements should take place in order to
protect the United States economy and homeland against terroristic activities.
Keywords Maritime security . NorthAmerican ports . Custom inspections . Shipping
containers
Introduction
The maritime shipping industry has grown steadily over the last several decades and is
forecasted to continue its steady growth for years to come (see UNCTAD 2013). The
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shipping industry plays a major role in the world economy and connects suppliers with
customers globally. These container ships have connected the world, lengthened the
supply chain and facilitated economic development in underprivileged countries.
According to IHS Global Insight, the cargo shipping industry transports two-thirds of
the value of total global trade, equating to over four trillion dollars a year (World
Shipping Council 2014; World Shipping Council, IHS Global Insight 2009). It is hard
to imagine shipping before containerization. Prior to 1956, all cargo that was
transported, with the exception of bulk commodities, was loaded on ships, rail and
trucks one at a time by manual labor. This inefficient and labor-intensive business
caused many problems such as shrinkage, delays and damage.
In 1955, McLean’s idea of the container to facilitate cargo handling made him the
originator of containerization (Cudahy 2006). His experiences on the piers helped
influence his idea of transporting his truck trailer directly on and off the ship. Unfor-
tunately, for all the quality of the container, enhancing efficiency and velocity has also
created a breach in traditional security. It has been difficult through the years to keep up
inspection of an ever increasing number of containers arriving daily. In 2001 after the
infamous terrorist attack, authorities realized just how big the security gap had grown
through the years. Supply chain security and securing containers became a priority for
many stakeholders (Véronneau and Roy 2014). The past 14 years have been spent in
playing catch up and improving the efficiency of the security inspections, moving from
physical random search to intelligence-based targeted search.
The container has revolutionized the way cargo moves around the world for more
than 50 years. Malcolm Mclean’s containerization ships solved many of the inefficien-
cies in the shipping industry and greatly reduced the number of unionized workers pier
side, which reduced operating costs significantly. These efficiencies lowered operating
costs, decreased delivery times and enabled intermodal transportation to become a
practical transportation solution for many companies. The container revolution has
helped transportation become so efficient that for many purposes, freight costs do not
effect economic decisions (Levinson 2010). Yet today’s containers remain vulnerable to
theft and pilferage as well as instruments to carry attacks (Véronneau et al. 2013).
Furthermore, ships spend less down time in port getting loaded and unloaded and more
time transporting goods throughout the world. This puts further pressure on ports for
efficient and expedited throughput. Hence, like any organizations striving for efficien-
cy, port authorities do not want security bottlenecks hindering the movement of goods.
Maritime impact on U.S. & global economy
The maritime industry is a driver of the world economy with over four trillion dollars of
cargo shipped annually. International maritime shipping connects nations together by
linking their economies though trade. The maritime domain facilitates global trade and
is a crucial function as 90 % of imports and exports by volume are transported by water
(IHS Global Insight 2009). A long-lasting healthy economy requires a robust transpor-
tation system and efficient trade. Adam Smith noted as far back as 1776 that efficient
maritime transport was a key factor of economic development, which remains through
today (see Smith 1776). Increasing commerce with other countries promotes their
prosperity and the prosperity of the United States. The U.S. maritime ports play an
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essential part in sustaining the economy. Our U.S. ports are vital for importing and
exporting goods from around the world. The U.S. is the largest importer of goods in the
world. Our nation’s maritime ports handle 78 % of all U.S. imports and exports (IHS
Global Insight 2009). The total number of TEUs imported into the U.S. in 2012 was
over 17.5 million (U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration
(MARAD) 2013). The top three ports by imported TEUs are Los Angeles, Long Beach
and New York. Figure 1 shows the top 12 U.S. ports by volume of TEUs imported into
the U.S.
The total metric tonnage of goods imported into the U.S. in 2012 was over 126.8
million (MARAD 2013). The top three ports by metric ton were Los Angeles, New
York and Long Beach. Figure 2 shows the top 12 U.S. ports by metric tons.
The U.S. port system is comprised of over 300 ports both inland and on the sea. As
shown in Fig. 2, only a few major seaports handle the majority of the cargo flowing into
the United States. In 2012, the total tonnage of imports and exports flowing into and out
of U.S. ports was over 244.9 million tons (MARAD 2013). This considerable amount
of trade is expected to grow steadily. The U.S. population is estimated to increase in
size to approximately 400 million by the year 2038 from 300 million in 2008 (IHS
Global Insight 2009). This increase in population will increase the amount of con-
sumption in the U.S. and therefore increase the amount of imports and exports from
U.S. ports.
This certain increase in the amount of trade will require added capacity at U.S. ports,
infrastructure investment, technological upgrades and security enhancements. An inef-
ficient maritime system would bottleneck the supply chains which would affect
individual companies and the overall economy. The importance of maritime commerce
cannot be understated and an incapable port system will hinder trade which is critical to
the U.S. and global economies. An attack on a major U.S. port which shuts down
operations could have a significant impact on the U.S. and global economies. It is
estimated that closing one of the major U.S. ports could cost the economy $1 billion
dollars a day for the first 5 days and increase significantly thereafter (Hart et al. 2002).
Fig. 1 Top U.S. ports by number of TEUs (from MARAD 2013)
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Security of U.S. ports
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) was signed into law on
November 25, 2002. This law created the U.S. maritime security system which required
federal agencies, U.S. vessels, and port facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments
and to develop security and incident response plans to better identify and deter threats.
In 2006, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE) was signed into
law. The SAFE act created the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program
(TWIC), Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), Container Security Initiative (CSI),
foreign port assessment program, and interagency operation centers. These programs
were created to strengthen and provided additional resources to improve U.S. port
security.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is now the federal agency tasked with
the overarching responsibility of protecting U.S. ports. The DHS has component
agencies that are tasked with specific priorities for the safeguarding of our ports. These
agencies include the Bureau of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Transpor-
tation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
Maritime Administration (MARAD) (DHS 2014). The CBP is the federal agency with
the primary task of screening and inspecting cargo, ships and passengers for prohibited
substances such as illicit drugs, explosives, biohazards and WMDs (U.S. Customs and
Border Protection 2014a). The TSA’s primary duty is security of air transportation but
has the responsibility for all modes of transportation. The TSA is responsible for the
management of the TWIC program, which controls access of maritime workers to port
facilities within the United States (TSA 2014).
The USCG is the Nation’s primary maritime law enforcement entity (USCG 2014).
The USCG enforces federal laws on waterways under U.S. jurisdiction. The Coast
Guard has the authority to board, inquire, inspect and search any vessel within U.S.
waterways. This broad power aids in deterring criminal and extremist activity. DNDO’s
Fig. 2 Top U.S. ports by metric tons (from MARAD 2013)
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primary responsibility is detection of nuclear and radiological threats within the United
States. The DNDO establishes nuclear protocols, monitors detection equipment and
scans containers at seaports before they enter U.S. commerce (DNCO 2014). The
PSGP was established as part of the SAFE act. FEMA is the federal agency responsible
for providing these federal grants to the state, local and private sectors of the maritime
industry to improve security infrastructure to mitigate terrorist risks (FEMA 2014).
Lastly, the U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration (MARAD) is
the federal agency within the Department of Transportation (DOT), which handles all
waterborne transportation. MARAD supports the commercial shipping industry by
providing maritime warnings and port operations; it also publishes maritime security
reports (MARAD 2014).
Although the United States has taken substantial government actions to increase the
security posture of the Nation’s maritime system, challenges and gaps will always
remain. There is an enormous amount of cargo that flows through our ports that is never
inspected. Every shipping container that enters the U.S. has on average 17 separate
points when the container temporarily stops (Flynn 2004). Port security therefore not
only involves the physical port facilities, it also involves all points through the supply
chain. This renders the United States very vulnerable to many different types of terrorist
attacks. Maximum security throughout this chain would impede trade and be exorbi-
tantly expensive. Effective security can increase efficiency at ports while an overabun-
dance of security can reverse all efficiency gains (Yeo et al. 2013). There will
continually be debates over the insufficient or exuberant amounts of federal resources
provided to the DHS for security protection. In these times of fiscal constraints, it will
be difficult to persuade tax payers to fund additional security initiatives. The DHS must
capitalize on the funded programs currently in place to enhance security.
The USCG is required to inspect maritime facilities at least once a year. The USCG
should consider inspecting these facilities quarterly or semi-annually and should require
discrepancies that are discovered to be tracked for analytical purposes. Key security
indicators should be used to identify possible gaps in the facilities security program
(Yang et al. 2014). The PSGP has $100 million dollars to provide security aimed
funding to states, localities and private stakeholders in fiscal year 2014. A portion of
this grant money can be allocated to improve the facilities where the Coast Guard finds
major discrepancies and key security indicators.
The foreign port assessment program along with CSI can be further developed to
secure U.S. ports. The ability to identify and inspect greater amounts of cargo at foreign
ports will increase U.S. port security. Currently CSI is operating in 58 ports throughout
the world; which comprises 80 % of the cargo shipped to the U.S. (IL 2014). Scanning
cargo overseas before its arrival into the United States will allow for more containers to
be screened and relieve container security congestion within U.S. ports. Coordination
with foreign governments and host nation support is essential for continued success and
further development of these programs.
Protection of the global supply chain
The National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security as laid out by the President of
the United States identifies the importance that security initiatives have on the supply
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chain. BThis strategy will enhance our ability to manage risk by building a layered
defense, addressing threats early, and fostering a resilient system that can absorb and
recover from unanticipated disruptions^ (NSGSCS 2012). The DHS has begun to put
in place measure that will enhance the security of cargo containers before they arrive in
the United States. Some of these measures include use of scanners and technology as
well as partnerships with foreign countries and companies that ship to U.S. ports. The
complexity of the supply chain is amazing and creates significant challenges (Barnes
and Oloruntoba 2005). The suppliers must interact with the ships and the ships must
interact with the ports. This complicated process creates vulnerabilities that terrorist
activities could exploit. Protection of the entire supply chain is of utmost concern for
the shipping industry. If some of these measures are not successful, the security of ports
will be of immense concern for the American public.
One initiative that has been put in place is the Megaports Initiative which as of 2012
has completed 42 out of the 100 planned Megaports in 31 countries (National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSN) 2010). These Megaports were created to detect
radiation at ports before these shipping containers left for the United States. The
initiative seeks to deter, detect and interdict nuclear or other radiological materials
from being smuggled through foreign seaports (DNCO 2014). Several types of equip-
ment have been used at these locations which have been successful to date in securing
U.S. ports from any radiological materials entering. Megaports collaborate with DHS,
CBP and other agencies in the performance of their duties. This collaboration has led to
the successful implementation of this program. The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) was
created with the hopes of scanning 100 % of U.S.-bound containers from foreign ports.
The SFI tries to secure the global supply chain by leveraging other programs already
put in place. The SFI allows for near real time transmittal of data that will be used with
other information to complete risk assessment to analyze and target containers overseas
for safer screening. The Secure Freight Initiative is not intended to replace CSI or
Megaports; rather, it provides the vehicle for taking advantage of the missions of both
programs to focus directly on the radiological and nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion (WMD) threat in the maritime container shipping environment (SFCM 2007).
The Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program was designed
to allow CBP to work without side agencies to review and approve the security of the
global supply chain (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2014b). Just like TSA allows
individuals to sign up for quick check-in at airports, the C-TPAT allows companies to
register with CBP which allows them less scrutiny on the scanning and inspection of
their cargo shipments to the U.S. When they join the anti‐terror partnership, companies
sign an agreement to work with CBP to protect the supply chain, identify security gaps
and implement specific security measures and best practices (U.S. Customs and Border
Protection 2014c). C-TPAT has a three-point strategic plan to assist in securing the
global supply chain which is designed to (1) improve security of a significant percent-
age of shipments to the United States; (2) provide benefits and incentives to private
sector companies that meet or exceed C-TPAT supply chain security criteria and best
practices; and (3) concentrate CBP’s inspectional resources and capabilities on higher
risk shipments (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2014d).
Inspection rates of Non C-TPAT companies are almost nine times as likely as those
that sign this agreement. These C-TPAT companies are granted fast-lane access upon
entry and through border crossings, which allows for quicker delivery times throughout
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the supply chain. The impact that the C-TPAT initiative has already had on imported
goods is very important to the economy. This initiative will continue to grow in size as
more companies from overseas see the benefits that are afforded to them. C-TPAT once
fully implemented and accepted by the majority of private organizations will allow for
faster transport, loading and unloading of their goods and services by CBP’s agents
upon entry to U.S. Ports. This initiative will likely have the greatest influence on port
security as long as the information provided by using companies is accurate and
complete.
A defense-in-depth strategy
In order to provide a comprehensive cargo and port defense-in-depth strategy, the
Department of Homeland Security’s BA National Cargo Security Strategy White
Paper^ envisions enhanced physical security of the global supply chain, recognition
of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological materials as the highest cargo security
threat, and the necessity to identify and inspect 100 % of high-risk cargo (DHS 2005).
The two most important elements that must be considered when planning a defense-in-
depth strategy are Information Systems and geography. Any and all information that is
made available to all agencies that are participating in this comprehensive strategy
concerning every ship and container that transits the waterways, the less likely that a
dangerous shipment will leave one port or reach another.
The first line of this defense-in-depth strategy should be a comprehensive and
inclusive Information System. The Information System’s security process would start
before shipping commences, with an internationally sanctioned purchase order entry
into a secure Information System prior to cargo ever making its way into a shipping
container. Currently, port terminal operators have no reliable way of verifying that a
cargo manifest matches the actual contents of a container. Utilizing technology that is
currently in place with most U.S. shipping companies that utilize bar code scanner
tracking would increase the awareness of cargo that is being shipped.
As more cargo containers continue to pass through a cargo security system, the more
effective this system will begin. This Information System coupled with increased
random inspections would help deter terroristic acts. Identifying possible high-risk
containers early would allow for further comprehensive inspections. All other cargo
would go through a standard search process at later lines of the defense-in-depth
described next. The inclusion in the C-TPAT initiative also allows for this Information
System to selectively screen cargo.
A valid second line of defense for U.S. ports is a proposal for offshore ports
with inspection sites available. These offshore ports would be responsible for
screening all identified high-risk selected cargo as well as an additional percentage
of any additional cargo that may be required by DHS. By putting these offshore
ports in play allows for better security of U.S. ports because it can identify any
issues prior to getting close enough to ports to cause any damage that can affect
the supply chain. BWe want our existing ports to be our final line of defense, not
the first^ (DHS 2005). The third line of defense in the defense-in-depth would be
the existing U.S. ports system. This line of defense would perform inspection on
any cargo left uninspected.
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Conclusion
Protecting the global supply chain is a concern for individuals and organizations
throughout the world. The economic impact that would be felt if there were some
disruption with the global supply chain would be tremendous—if not disastrous —to
the global economy. Collaboration between government agencies, the international
trade community and public transportation companies is a must to ensure that there
are no gaps that can be exploited during transit of cargo via the waterways. The
Department of Homeland Security is the lead organization for the overall success of
port security. DHS has a dedicated department and manpower that focuses directly on
implementation of strategies and initiatives to promote overall security of cargo
shipments. Initiatives that have been put in place such as SAFE, TWIC, PSGP and
CSI have greatly contributed to improving security. As these programs continue to
mature, security procedures will be refined and improved. Improvements in security
programs will provide a greater overall security layer that will increase safety through-
out the supply chain in U.S. ports and will allow for quicker processing of cargo upon
entry to the U.S. The Megaports Initiative and C-TPAT have been highly successful
with security of cargo coming from international locations. Although the financial
impact of maintaining the Megaports Initiative is extremely high, it is essential that the
program remains continuously funded well into the future to promote a sense of
security from terrorist threats.
Overarching security of the homeland will remain the focus of DHS for years to
come. As new technology and equipment become available which can assist with
detection and deterrence of threats, the United States must be proactive and provide the
resources necessary to protect American lives, interests and economy. There is no clear
way ahead that can guarantee 100 % security of our U.S. ports. The proactive approach
of continuous monitoring by the U.S. is a step in the right direction to ensure the safety
and security of the country. Lastly, it must be borne in mind that we cannot overspend
ourselves into security measures that will never guarantee 100 % security. We must
strive for a common sense approach that closes the gaps and invests in intelligence-
based measures to reduce the threats. All these security measures are not free: The cost
is from both indirect and direct taxes paid by citizens and consumers. One must
remember that one of Bin Laden’s goals in the 9/11 attacks was to push the United
States spending in security to a level so high that we would bankrupt ourselves.
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